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Abstract
Discrete choice models of labor supply easily account for nonlinearity and nonconvexity in budget
sets caused by tax-bene￿t systems. As a result, they have become very popular for ex ante evaluations
of policy reforms. In this paper, we question whether the degree of ￿ exibility and the implicit
household representation in these models are satisfying when confronted to the data. First, we show
that attempts to interpret discrete models structurally lead to unnecessary parametric restrictions in
most studies. We suggest instead a fully ￿ exible model that retains usual assumptions on economic
rationality except regularity conditions on leisure. Indeed, coe¢ cients may account for both tastes
and costs of work, possibly making ￿ preferences￿appear nonconvex. Second, we show that the static
unitary representation, implicit in most tax policy analyses, is rejected against a more general model
with price- and income- dependent preferences. The latter can be rationalized in terms of collective
or intertemporal models and o⁄ers promising perspectives in these directions. Simulations show that
the magnitude of predicted labor supply responses to tax-bene￿t reforms is sensitive to the underlying
household representation.
Key Words : multinomial logit, household labor supply, tax reform, unitary model, collective
model.
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The understanding of household labor supply behavior continues to attract considerable research interest,
the main motivation for it being the recurring importance placed on responses to tax and bene￿t reforms
(see Blundell and MaCurdy, 2000, for a comprehensive survey). The recent literature relies heavily on
discrete choice modeling. This approach requires the explicit parameterization of consumption-leisure
preferences and maximization is reduced to choosing among a discrete set of possibilities. This allows
dealing easily with complex tax-bene￿t systems that yield nonlinearities and nonconvexities in agents￿
budget sets. The simultaneity of the participation decision and the choice of work duration is also handled
in a straightforward way. Finally, the joint decision in couples is easily modeled as a natural extension
of the single case, as in Aaberge et al. (1995) and van Soest (1995). Under these conditions, the success
of the discrete approach among labor supply modelers came as no surprise.1
Also in contrast with the Hausman approach, discrete-choice models impose in principle little con-
straint on preferences. However, it is not sure whether constraints on functional forms are totally relaxed
in practice. Moreover, the ￿ standard￿household representation most often imposed in current applica-
tions ￿i.e. unitary households taking decision in a static environment ￿may be rejected when brought
to the data. In this paper, we explore these two potential limits. To do so, we estimate the labor supply
of French married women and suggest a series of nested models that can be tested one against the oth-
ers. These models relax step by step the restrictions usually imposed on functional forms and household
representation.
The ￿rst question we address is whether ￿ exibility is achieved in practice. We survey the recent
literature and show that the model usually at use ￿a structural model with ￿xed costs of work ￿imposes
unecessary parametric restrictions. Instead, the utility function may be speci￿ed in a very general way,
with coe¢ cients that vary with the labor supply alternatives. This unrestricted model achieves the
best possible ￿t while imposing usual requirements on economic rationality. In particular, it relies on a
utility-maximizing interpretation, with quasi-concave and increasing utility of income, so that traditional
e¢ ciency-equity analysis of tax reforms can be performed. While costs of work are generally identi￿ed
from preferences only at the price of parametric restriction, they are implicitly incorporated in the
coe¢ cients of the ￿ exible model and regularity conditions on leisure need not to hold.
Under this more ￿ exible form, choices still depend on household disposable income achieved at each
discrete hour along with household characteristics. This speci￿cation thus maintains the ￿ standard￿
representation of household decisions; in particular, it still assumes income pooling, a necessary condition
of the unitary model. A second generalization then consists in a model that depends on wage rates and
disaggregated exogenous incomes, as if preferences were price- and income-dependent. Such a model
unambiguously rejects the standard approach, suggesting that the unitary and static representation may
not be the most appropriate one to approximate ￿ true￿behaviors. Interestingly, the general model can
be rationalized along the lines of intertemporal or bargaining models, providing a basis for further tests
1The traditional continuous approach presented in Hausman (1981) is usually restricted to the case of piecewise linear
and convex budget sets. To account for nonconvexities, as in Hausman and Ruud (1984), labor supply must be speci￿ed
parametrically together with the corresponding direct utility function, which implies rather restrictive forms for preferences.
In addition, MaCurdy et al. (1990) have emphasized that the model requires the global satisfaction of Slutsky conditions
by the labor supply function, and hence imposes undesirable a priori restrictions on estimated behavior.
1in these directions.
Finally, we compare the predictions of the di⁄erent models to a tax-bene￿t reform. The magni-
tude of labor supply responses is sensitive to the model at use. Future ex post evaluations may allow
discriminating between the di⁄erent household representations on this basis.
The layout of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we introduce a series of nested discrete-choice
models with di⁄erent levels of ￿ exibility and brie￿ y discuss their economic interpretation; likelihood ratio
tests are conducted in Section 3. The ex ante evaluation of a tax-bene￿t reform is performed in Section
4 using the di⁄erent models. Section 5 concludes.
2 Discrete-choice Models of Labor Supply with Taxation
2.1 Multinomial Logit
The representation of discrete choices through the multinomial logit speci￿cation is the basis of this paper.
The choice of working hours is supposed to be made between a ￿nite number of alternatives, corresponding
to commonly agreed durations of work, e.g. part-time, full-time and overtime. If household i can choose
among J discrete alternatives, the utility it may derive from alternative j (= 1;:::;J) is assumed to be
given by:
Vij = U(Hj;Cij;Zi;vi;￿) + ￿ij: (1)
In that expression, U stands for the household utility derived from working Hj hours per week and from
the corresponding level of weekly household consumption Cij, conditionally on a vector Zi of demographic
characteristics, unobserved heterogeneity vi and a vector ￿ of common preference parameters. Let the ￿rst
alternative represent the choice of non-participation, i.e. H1 = 0: The deterministic utility is completed
by an i.i.d. error term ￿ij assumed to represent possible observational errors, optimization errors or
transitory departures from best choice by agents (see van Soest, 1995). As justi￿ed later, we assume in
our empirical application that men in couple have ￿xed labor supply and we focus on the work behavior
of married women, for whom we model J alternatives. In principle, it is also possible to model joint
decisions of couples by simply extending labor supply alternatives to J combinations of partners￿discrete
hours.
In the present static framework, consumption coincides with disposable income as given by the fol-
lowing budget constraint:
Cij = D(wiHj; ym
i ;yK
i ;￿i): (2)
The arguments of function D are some socio-demographic characteristics ￿i of household i as well as the
various sources of gross income, namely the female worker￿ s labor income wiHj, with wi her wage rate,
her husband￿ s labor income ym
i (treated as exogenous), and the household unearned income yK
i . The
mapping of gross income into disposable income, D, stands for a fairly complex set of tax-bene￿t rules,
typically approximated by microsimulation. Costs of work may also be taken out of total disposable
income, as further discussed below.
Under the assumption that error terms ￿ij follow a I-extreme value (I-EV) distribution, and for a given
2type vi, the (conditional) probability that household i choose alternative k has the following explicit form:





One of the preference parameters ￿ is assumed to be a⁄ected by a normally distributed term vi, allowing
for random taste heterogeneity and unrestricted substitution patterns between alternatives. The uncon-
ditional probability of choosing alternative k is then obtained by integrating Pik over all values of vi.2
In practice, this is obtained by averaging the conditional probability over a large number of draws. We
thus derive a simulated likelihood function that can be maximized to obtain estimates of parameters ￿.
Measurement errors due to the discretization can be handled in the way described by MaCurdy et al.
(1990).
2.2 Structural and Unconstrained Models with Discrete Choices
The preceding discrete-choice model is fully structural in the sense that it completely speci￿es consumption-
leisure preferences for household i and choice j. Thus it shall be referred to as model (S) hereafter. In
practice, a certain number of restrictions are imposed implicitly or explicitly on this model. Firstly, the
disposable incomes obtained for choices k 6= j do not enter the utility of choosing alternative j. This
is a usual restriction made for obvious identi￿cation reasons. Secondly, a given functional form is to be
chosen for U, in which the set of parameters ￿ that describe preferences is usually not speci￿c to the
quantity of labor that is supplied, that is, ￿j = ￿ for all choices j. This must introduce parameter restric-
tions across alternatives. Thirdly, well-behaved preferences require the usual properties of monotonicity
and quasi-concavity of U with respect to hours of work and consumption. In fact, the discrete-choice
approach consists of utility maximization over a ￿nite budget and does not require tangency conditions
to hold. They may nontheless be imposed to comply with economic theory.3 A good reason not to
force models to verify regularity conditions on leisure comes from the introduction of other structural
components. Precisely, ￿ exibility is often achieved by the addition of ￿xed costs of work or dummies for
part-time options. Those are identi￿ed only under parametric assumptions on preferences.4 Heim and
Meyer (2004) thus point at the di¢ culty of incorporating a realistic rendering of these costs and argue
that they can make ￿ preferences￿appear nonconvex.
Acknowledging these limitations, we suggest a model where coe¢ cients vary freely with labor supply
alternatives. This ￿ unconstrained￿model (U) is written:
Vij = U(Cij;Zi;vi;￿j) + ￿ij: (4)
2Theoretically, it is possible to vary randomly all the coe¢ cients. This may become enormously complex however, as
multiple integrals have to be solved (Train, 2003).
3Often in practice, they are simply checked a posteriori to avoid the MaCurdy critique (see MaCurdy et al., 1990).
4We could not make this point better than van Soest et al. (2002): ￿...the intuitive explanation why ￿xed costs
are identi￿ed is the lack of observation with a small positive number of working hours. While this argument is valid for a
restrictive speci￿cation of the utility function that limits the way in which utility can vary with working hours, the argument
would no longer hold if the speci￿cation of the utility function were fully non-parametric. For such a speci￿cation, the utility
function itself could pick up the gap in the distribution at few hours, assigning lower utility to such hours values. Thus it
seems that the ￿xed costs are nonparametrically unidenti￿ed.￿
3Naturally, the way utility varies with the level of labor is entirely counted for by alternative-speci￿c
coe¢ cients ￿j, i.e. Hj does not need enter the speci￿cation any longer. Think, for instance, of a
speci￿cation where disutility of work takes the linear form ￿Hj in the structural model. The di⁄erence
in disutility between alternatives k and l is just a function of the di⁄erence in hours, i.e. ￿(Hk ￿ Hl), so
that moving from 20 to 30 hours/week has the same e⁄ect as moving from 30 to 40 hours. In model (U),
this is replaced by the di⁄erence of two parameters, say ￿k ￿ ￿l, so that the (marginal) disutility varies
in a ￿ exible way across alternatives.
Model (U) perfectly illustrates the point made above about parametric identi￿cation of the di⁄erent
structural components. In (U), choice-speci￿c parameters necessarily capture preferences together with
costs of work and several other aspects that determine work duration. In these circumstances, there is
no reason to impose regularity conditions on leisure. Nonetheless, the model requires natural restrictions
to comply with basic economic rationality. Clearly, it still relies on the fundamental assumption of
utility-maximizing behavior. The fact that utility functions increase with income C is also a minimum
requirement for meaningful policy analysis using model (U). Finally, quasi-concavity of preferences does
not necessarily need to be imposed a priori, as discussed previously and in van Soest et al. (2002). In
the empirical part, we shall use (U) to test the parameter restrictions across alternatives imposed by the
structural model (S).
2.3 A Non-standard Model
In previous models, wages and exogenous incomes in￿ uence labor supply only through household dispos-
able income, which supposes income pooling ￿a necessary condition of the unitary model ￿and a static
framework. In that sense, both (U) and (S) are standard models. To go one step further, we suggest a
model where the set of explanatory variables has been extended as follows:
Vij = U(Cij;wi;ym
i ;yK
i ;Zi;vi;￿j) + ￿ij: (5)
In this general model (G), utility at alternative j now depends on disposable income together with the
female wage rate, male earnings and non-labor income, as if, in some sense, preferences were price-
and income-dependent. Importantly, a rejection of (U) against (G) would signify that the standard
representation is not the best approximation of actual behaviors.
A very appealing structural interpretation of model (G) is the collective model of labor supply (Chi-
appori, 1988). This approach accounts for several decision-makers in the household and only assumes
e¢ ciency of spouses￿decisions. Let us consider a collective model with purely private consumption (the
reasoning can be extended to account for public goods within the household). We drop subscript i and








utility function of spouse s = f;m conditionally on the wife working Hj hours a week (the husband￿ s
labor supply is exogenously ￿xed). Under minimal regularity conditions, the collective decision problem














4where the Pareto weight ￿ represents the balance of power in the household and depends on wages and
exogenous incomes, i.e. ￿ = ￿(w;ym;yK). If we ￿rst take j as ￿xed and maximize with respect to
individual consumptions, the solution can be denoted by cs = cs(Hj;Cj;￿) for s = f;m and substituted
in the household welfare index to yield the (reduced-form) welfare:
U(Cj;Hj;￿)
expressed conditionally on j. Then this index is simply maximized with respect to labor supply. When
using discrete alternatives, this second step boils down to the discrete labor supply model under study.
With the ￿ exible approach previously introduced, the index can be rewritten
U(Cj;￿(w;ym;yK);￿j)
Clearly, such a collective model is not identi￿ed; this is simply a reduced form of the household welfare
function.5 The important point here is that it resembles model (G) very closely. The only di⁄erence is
that female wage rate and exogenous incomes enter the household objective function through the same
function ￿ for all choices j = 1;:::;J:6
Model (G) can be rationalized in other ways and in particular along the line of an intertemporal
unitary model. Indeed, any (static) structural model would be consistent with utility maximization in a
life cycle framework with inter-temporally separable preferences if disposable income could be replaced
by total expenditures (see Blundell and Walker, 1986). Since households cannot save under the static in-
terpretation, the coe¢ cients on female wage and exogenous incomes in model (G) may capture smoothing
or precautionary decisions.
Discriminating amongst the various possible interpretations embedded in the reduced-form utility of
(G) is not the purpose of this paper. However, each alternative interpretation (intertemporal, collective,
etc.) would imply speci￿c additional restrictions that could be tested. Note ￿nally that previous inter-
pretations assume that tax reforms only change total disposable income but do not a⁄ect other features
which are not modeled. In particular, we implicitly rule out the e⁄ect of tax reforms on wage dynamics
over the life cycle or on the (reduced-form) power index ￿ in a collective model. In this respect, we follow
the bulk of the literature.7
2.4 Speci￿cations
Before suggesting some speci￿cations for models (S), (U) and (G), we report in Table 1 a non-exhaustive
review of recent studies using discrete choice models for policy analysis. It clearly illustrates that the
5This is not a problem here since our main objective is to use the model for labor supply analysis, and not to mea-
sure welfare analysis at the individual level. Identi￿cation of individual preferences would necessarily require additional
restrictions.
6Preliminary results show that this necessary condition of the collective model is rejected. However, these tests deserve
more attention and are the subject of future research.
7Outside options or power indices usually depend on gross incomes or gross wages in the literature on bargaining models.
Laisney (2002) is among the rare exceptions. In the real world, there are some examples of very speci￿c tax-bene￿t reforms
that imply a net transfer from one spouse to the other, and may therefore a⁄ect the balance of power in the household (see
for instance Lundberg et al., 1997). The reform simulated in the present paper is unlikely to generate such intrahousehold
redistribution.
5discrete approach is increasingly used in many OECD countries to study a large variety of tax-bene￿t
policies. Quadratic or translog functional forms are typically used and additional ￿ exibility is often
achieved by the introduction of ￿xed cost of work or part-time dummies ￿the latter are justi￿ed as search
cost or rationing of less common working hours.8 To our knowledge, the only discrete-choice model that
accounts for variable costs is that of Blundell et al. (2000). Variable childcare costs, estimated in a ￿rst
stage on the sub-sample of households buying childcare, are withdrawn from disposable income using a
deterministic relationship between mothers￿working hours and these costs.
The only structural model with ￿ exible preferences is that of van Soest et al. (2002).9 Their model
attains non-parametric ￿ exibility by using higher order polynomial forms of the utility functions than the
usual quadratic form. This approach and the model (U) introduced in the present paper are compared
in Ny⁄eler (2005) using estimates on Swiss data. In (U), ￿ exibility is obtained directly, in a way that
makes the underlying indi⁄erence curves discrete rather than continuous. This is after all consistent with
a framework where the budget set itself is discrete.
2.4.1 Structural Model
We then suggest several speci￿cations of the structural model (S), from the popular forms found in
the literature to more ￿ exible variants which allow a fair comparison with model (U). First, a frequent
speci￿cation, as seen in Table 1, consists of a quadratic utility completed with ￿xed costs of work Fij.
A translog speci￿cation could alternatively be chosen but log terms would not allow negative net-of-cost
income. This ￿rst structural model (S1) is written for choice j = 1;:::;J:
Uij = ￿cc(Cij ￿ Fij)2 + ￿hh(Hj)2 + ￿ch(Cij ￿ Fij)Hj + ￿c




i = ￿c0 + ￿c0Zi + vi
￿h
i = ￿h0 + ￿h0Zi;
and vectors ￿c0 = (￿c1;:::;￿cL), ￿h0 = (￿h1;:::;￿hL). Preference variation across households is enabled
by the introduction of observed heterogeneity in the vector Zi = (z1
i ;:::;zL
i )0, which corresponds to L = 7
characteristics: to live in the Paris area, the number of children respectively between 0 and 2, 3 and 5,
and 6 and 11, total number of children and the parents￿age. The coe¢ cient on disposable income, ￿c
i,
is assumed to be the random one ￿a natural choice to make models (S) and (U) easily comparable. The
random component vi is modeled as ￿ui, with ui following a standard normal distribution and ￿ the
standard error to be estimated. Costs Fij are to be paid if the wife starts to work. They vary with four
household characteristics and are assumed non-stochastic:
Fi1 = 0
Fij = f0 + f1Paris + f2Child02 + f3Child35 + f4Child611 if j > 1:
8In the case of the Netherlands, for instance, part-time is typically overpredicted at the expense of non-participation.
This is solved by adding dummies for part-time in van Soest (1995) or ￿xed costs of work in Das and van Soest (2001) and
Van Soest et al. (2002). Thereby, the interpretation of structural components appears to be somewhat ad hoc.
9Blomquist and Newey (2002) estimate a non-parametric labor supply function in the presence of taxation. However,
some of the limitations of the Hausman approach equally apply to this generalization.











(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
van Soest (1995) Netherlands Dutch SEP 1987 C T PT RP topical tax reforms
Aaberge, Dagsvik & Strøm (1995) Norway n.a. C # # # progressive tax system
Callan & van Soest (1996) Ireland IDS 1987 C T FC RP rationing individualized taxation
Euwals & van Soest (1996) Netherlands Dutch SEP 1988 S, C T FC RP rationing
change in income support/assess
importance of rationing
Hoynes (1996) US SIPP 1984 C S FC MX stigma employment effect of the AFDC
Bingley & Walker (1997) UK FES 78-92 SM linear RP
rationing,
stigma
variations in the Family Credit
Keane & Moffitt (1998) US SIPP 1984 SM Q RP
simult. wage,
stigma
actual increase in AFDC
Aaberge, Colombino & Strøm (1999) Italy SHIW 1987 C # # #
Duncan & McCrae (1999) UK FRS 1994-96 SM, C Q FC RP
childcare,
rationing
from FC to WFTC
Blundell, Duncan, McCrae, Meghir (2000) UK FRS 1995-6 S, C Q FC RP
chilcare,
stigma
from FC to WFTC
Aaberge, Colombino & Strøm (2000)
Italy, Noway,
Sweden
n.a. C # # # hypothetical flat tax reform
Das and Van Soest (2001) Netherlands Dutch SEP 1995 C T FC RP rationing proposed tax reforms
van Soest, Das & Gong (2002) Netherlands Dutch SEP 1995 C Q, P FC RP simult. wage test flexible specifications
Gong & van Soest (2002) Mexico city Urban Employment Survey C T FC RP simult. wage estimation and sensitivity analysis
Bonin, Kempe & Schneider (2002) Germany GSOEP 2000 C T PT alternative low-wage subsidies
Duncan (2002) Australia IDS SM Q FC RP
announced earned income tax
credit
Flood, Hansen & Wahlberg (2003) Sweden HIS 1993 C T MX stigma hypothetical flat tax reform
Kalb & Scutella (2003) New Zealand HES 1991-2001 S, C Q FC RP estimation
Gerfin & Leu (2003) Switzerland Swiss IES 1998 S, C Q RP alternative in-work policies
Steiner & Wrohlich (2004) Germany GSOEP 2002 C T PT
hypothetical income tax reforms and
actual mini job reform
Labeaga, Oliver & Spadaro (2005) Spain ECHP 1995 S, C Q FC
hypothetical flat tax scheme and
recent tax reforms




Bargain & Orsini (2006)
France, Germany,
Finland
HBS 95, GSOEP 98, IDS
98
S, C Q FC hypothetical in-work policies
Orsini (2007) Belgium Belgian PSBH 2001 C Q PT recent Belgian reforms
(1) Selection: Single male and female (S), Single Mothers (SM), Couples (C)
(2) Functional form: translog (T), quadratic (Q), higher polynomial form (P), Stone Geary (S)
(4) Structural flexibility is achieved using: part-time dummies (PT), fixed cost of work (FC) or, equivalently, fixed revenues of not working.
(5) Unobserved heterogeneity: normally distributed component (random parameter logit: RP), mass points à la Heckman-Singer (mixed logit: MX), none (conditional logit).
# : This series of paper departs from the rest of the literature; they suggests the estimation of joint distributions of wage and hours and the sets of hour-wage opportunities vary across individuals.
(6) Other features: first-step estimation of childcare expenses in function of female hours (childcare), simultaneous wage estimation (simult. wage), accounting for rationing using double hurdle model or information on desired hours
(rationing), modeling of welfare program non-participation due to informational/search costs or stigma (stigma)
Note: all studies are based on the multinomial logit model except Bingley and Walker (multinomial probit); only static models of hour choice are reported here -- models of mere participation decisions or models mixing labor supply with
other types of decisions (fertility, chilcare types, etc.) are not reviewed due to lack of space.
7As discussed above, ￿xed costs of work are not non-parametrically identi￿ed in (S1). Identi￿cation
relies on the fact that the utility function in (S1) is not fully ￿ exible and on exclusion restrictions regarding
household characteristics placed on preferences and ￿xed costs respectively. Model (S1) thus corresponds
to the type of speci￿cation most frequently used in the literature (cf. Table 1).
In a variant (S2), we would like to account for variable work costs due to childcare for households with
children aged 0-2. For older children, full day childcare provided by public kindergarten (maternelles) is
basically free, with unlimited supply and accessible geographically to most households. To account for
variable care costs for the youngest children, we make the corresponding coe¢ cient f2
j vary freely with
the labor supply alternative.10 This conforms to the fact that childcare costs typically increase with the
working time of the mothers for children in that age group.
In a last variant (S3), the average cost of work is also made variable across alternatives, i.e. f0
j , to
account for the fact that other types of costs (e.g., transportation costs) may also depend on the number
of hours worked per week. These costs are clearly not identi￿ed, even parametrically. In fact, the purpose
of this model is rather illustrative: variable costs are a device to achieve more ￿ exibility and make (S3)
the most comparable version to model (U).
2.4.2 Unconstrained Model
The unconstrained model (U) is made comparable to (S) by use of the following quadratic form:
Uij = ajC2
ij + bijCij + cij for j = 1;:::;J: (U)
Heterogeneity is written as:
bij = b0
j + b0















j ) and c0
j = (c1
j;:::;cL
j ):11 Probability of choice j is written as:
Pr(ajC2
ij ￿ akC2
ik + bijCij ￿ bikCik + cij ￿ cik > ￿ik ￿ ￿ij;8k 6= j):
Because disposable income Cij di⁄ers across alternatives, all coe¢ cients a and b can be identi￿ed. The
econometric indeterminacy on the last coe¢ cient is removed by setting it to zero for the ￿rst alternative
(ci1 = 0). Model (U) nests all types of structural models (S) introduced above. For instance, model (S1)
imposes 156 restrictions on model (U), which corresponds to the di⁄erence in the numbers of coe¢ cients
of the two models. The 4 constraints aj = a1(= ￿cc) for j = 2;:::;5 are straightforward. It is very simple
to derive all the other constraints analytically ￿a formal proof is available upon request to the author.
10Performing a ￿rst step estimation on households purchasing formal childcare, as in Blundell et al. (2000), did not
provide satisfying results.
11Notice that unobserved heterogeneity vi is placed on the coe¢ cient of consumption, here bij. As in van Soest (1995),
it is not alternative-speci￿c, which makes this part of the speci￿cation directly comparable to (S)-models. In other words,
additional ￿exibility in (U) is placed only on the deterministic part of the model.
82.4.3 General Model
Going one step further and keeping with the quadratic speci￿cation, a natural form for model (G) is as
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It is straightforward to see that this speci￿cation nests model (U). In (G) the usual indeterminacy for
determinants which are not alternative-speci￿c is removed by setting these coe¢ cients to zero for the ￿rst
alternative. Note that disposable income is itself a function of female wage rate, male earnings, unearned
income and household characteristics. Identi￿cation in model (G) then necessarily relies on the strong
nonlinearities of the tax-bene￿t function D in (2).12
3 Data, Selection and Discretization
The data used are selected from the French Household Budget Survey 1994-95. We have kept only
married or cohabiting couples where adult members are in the age bracket 25 ￿64 and where the wife
is available for the labor market, i.e. not disabled, retired or a student. Households where the wife is
self-employed are also withdrawn since they are subject to di⁄erent income tax rules from those applying
to salary workers and require unavailable additional information. Extreme households are selected out,
notably those receiving important levels of non-labor income. To be consistent with a pure supply side
approach and because we do not model rationing, we withdraw households with job seekers.
At this stage, 97% of the men in our selection are in work. Indeed, most of men in couple are
employed and those out of work are usually involuntary unemployed, and hence not in our selection.
Then we withdraw the few households with inactive men and focus purely on female labor supply, i.e.
male hours are assumed ￿xed at observed values. This is a usual choice in the labor supply literature
using French data (see Laroque and SalaniØ, 2002, Donni and Moreau, 2007). The ￿nal selection contains
3;397 couples; corresponding descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2.
In France, institutional norms and demand-side constraints imply concentrations around a limited
number of working time arrangements. This is illustrated by the distribution of female hours reported in
Figure 3. We simply base our discretization on the main concentration points, that is Hj = 0;20;30;39;45
12In all models above, non-parametric identi￿cation is not obtained for parameters of household/individual characteristics
which are present both as taste/cost shifters and as determinants of the tax-bene￿t rules in function D ( i.e. for Zi \ ￿i);
again, parametric identi￿cation relies on the nonlinearities of the tax-bene￿t system.
9hours a week, with corresponding intervals [0￿10[, [10￿25[, [25￿34[, [34￿42[ and over 42 respectively.
For the year under consideration, full-time and part-time are institutionally ￿xed at 39 and 20 hours
in France; three-quarter of a full-time (30 hours) is an option frequently o⁄ered by ￿rms, especially to
women; the 45 hours option corresponds to overtime. The proportion of households in each bracket is
24%, 12:6%, 10:9%, 44:7% and 7:8% respectively.13
Disposable income at each discrete choice of hours is computed using the French tax-bene￿t microsim-
ulation SYSIFF98. This program allows the simulation of all direct taxes and bene￿ts of instruments
(see Bargain and Terraz, 2003). Wages for inactive women are predicted using the traditional Heckman
correction. Because the labor supply models are nonlinear, it is necessary to take the wage rate prediction
errors explicitly into account for a consistent estimation of the models, by integrating out the disturbance
term of the wage equation in the likelihood. Practically, this is done by approximating the integral by a
simulated mean for a tractable number of draws (20).14 Wage prediction for active women shows that
the ￿t is reasonably good, even though the predicted distribution is, as often, more concentrated (results
are available upon request). Following the bulk of the literature, we implicitly assume that gross hourly
wage rates do not depend on working duration (this assumption is relaxed in Ilmakunnas and Pudney,
1990).
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Selected Couples
Women Men
Participation 0.77 1
Working time of participants (hours/week) 34.7 41.9
Gross wage rate - participant (euro/hour) 11.7
Gross wage rate - all potential workers  (euro/hour)* 11.0
Age 38.9 41.1
Primary education 0.31 0.18
Vocational training 0.38 0.46
High school diploma 0.15 0.18
University studies 0.17 0.18
Average number of children
Presence of child 0-2
Presence of child 3-5
Presence of child 6-11
Number of observations
Weighted size of the sample
Size in % of total population









13A large number of alternatives could become intractable, especially for ￿exible models. Five categories seem reasonable
to capture the main peaks in the actual distribution without increasing too much the number of parameters. Nonetheless,
models (U) and (G) may be limited by the fact that they require large enough samples and a limited number of alternatives.
This point is discussed in the next section.
14Since the tax-bene￿t simulations are not performed in an econometric software, it was not possible to estimate the wage















Distribution of Working Hours for Women with Employed Partners (selection)
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Estimation
Table 3 presents the results of the estimations for the structural models (S). We follow the traditional
way to interpret coe¢ cients in terms of consumption-leisure preferences and costs of work. However, as
argued in the text, (S1) is identi￿ed thanks to functional form assumptions while (S3) is not identi￿ed,
even parametrically. Interpretations should then be made with much caution. The only signi￿cant
parameters for disposable income are the constant term and some of the variables related to children.
Conversely, many of the estimates for hours are signi￿cant. As could have been expected, the marginal
utility of work decreases with the presence of children. Women prefer to work signi￿cantly more if
located in the Paris area and less if in older couples, suggesting a move toward single-earner couples as
the household ages or simply a cohort e⁄ect.
The coe¢ cient for average cost of work is signi￿cant in (S1) and (S2). However, non-identi￿cation in
(S3) translates in the fact that coe¢ cients on H, H2 and C￿H are not signi￿cant ￿in contrast to (S1) and
(S2) ￿and neither are alternative-speci￿c coe¢ cients for variable costs. Working in Paris region seems
to increase work costs. They decrease with the number of young children in (S1). This counter-intuitive
result, also found in van Soest et al. (2002), can probably be attributed to identi￿cation problems, since
the variable also enters the marginal utilities of consumption and leisure. In model (SC2), however,
the variable cost due to the presence of children aged 0-2 is signi￿cant and increases as expected with
mothers￿work duration (excepted for the full-time option). Overall, estimates yield implausible values
for the cost of work, equal on average to 41% of the average earnings of working wives. This seemingly
deceiving result actually re￿ ects identi￿cation issues; coe¢ cients are also likely to capture more than
supply-side dimensions and in particular rationing at certain hours. This point is discussed in detail by
Bourguignon and Magnac (1990). The non-signi￿cance of ￿ childcare costs￿at full-time (j = 4) in model
(S2) might re￿ ect the overwhelming presence of full-time contracts and the possible lack of alternative
11options for women with children. Yet, only 40% of working women work full time (34 to 42 hours) so
that the rationing hypothesis cannot be maintained for the whole sample.
Table 3: MNL estimation of the structural models
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
income² -22.640 *** 6.219 -26.376 *** 6.665 -64.852 *** 10.747
female hours² -10.684 *** 0.698 -9.831 *** 0.764 1.231 1.021
female hours x income -14.759 *** 1.656 -14.818 *** 1.548 -4.394 9.425
income 26.451 * 13.517 36.786 *** 13.728 8.286 20.679
x age 0.104 0.653 -0.318 0.672 1.734 1.098
x age square 0.001 0.008 0.006 0.008 -0.017 0.014
x # children -0.380 0.752 -0.373 0.808 -1.912 1.278
x # children 0-2 -3.449 3.117 -6.661 ** 2.639 -3.664 4.068
x # children 3-5 6.047 ** 2.698 5.102 ** 2.464 5.717 ** 2.533
x # children 6-11 2.926 2.328 3.261 2.132 1.644 1.853
x 1(Paris region) 0.447 3.214 -0.275 2.696 -2.952 2.151
female hours 10.562 *** 2.486 10.759 *** 2.280 -2.530 1.738
x age 0.278 ** 0.123 0.220 * 0.113 0.212 0.140
x age square -0.004 *** 0.002 -0.003 ** 0.001 -0.004 *** 0.001
x # children -0.566 *** 0.142 -0.557 *** 0.134 -0.455 *** 0.159
x # children 0-2 -0.407 0.310 -0.852 0.516 0.068 0.531
x # children 3-5 -0.211 0.239 -0.327 0.220 -0.829 * 0.480
x # children 6-11 -0.335 * 0.186 -0.337 ** 0.171 -0.624 *** 0.207
x 1(Paris region) 1.790 *** 0.233 1.742 *** 0.207 1.849 *** 0.334
fixed costs/40000 0.190 *** 0.027 0.169 *** 0.024 - -
x 1(Paris region) 0.029 0.018 0.031 ** 0.014 0.027 *** 0.008
x # children 0-2 -0.022 ** 0.011 - - - -
x # children 3-5 -0.014 0.010 -0.017 * 0.009 -0.005 0.005
x # children 6-11 0.190 *** 0.027 -0.013 0.009 -0.005 0.004
variable costs/40000
x # children 0-2 / j=2 - - 0.034 ** 0.016 0.021 ** 0.010
x # children 0-2 / j=3 - - 0.063 *** 0.021 0.015 0.013
x # children 0-2 / j=4 - - 0.000 0.025 0.017 0.016
x # children 0-2 / j=5 - - 0.085 *** 0.031 0.041 ** 0.019
x j=2 - - - - 0.021 0.032
x j=3 - - - - 0.036 0.048
x j=4 - - - - 0.003 0.064
x j=5 - - - - 0.070 0.071
Nb of observations
Level of significance: *=10%, **=5%, ***=1%




Flexible speci￿cations (U) and (G) capture broader heterogeneity in preferences but may also cause a
larger number of households not to respect regularity conditions. As stated above, positive monotonicity
and quasi-concavity in consumption seem natural requirements to perform meaningful policy analysis,
albeit unnecessary for coherency of the econometric model. The ￿rst condition is respected at more than
99% in the (S)-models, at 96% in (U) but only at 77% in (G). It is written as:








j wf + ￿
mc
j ym + ￿
Kc
j yK ￿ 0 in (G)
and is easily imposed as a constraint in the likelihood maximization.15 Quasi-concavity in C is simply
15In practice, and for both (U) and (G), Lagrangian multipliers need to depart only very slightly from zero to guarantee
C-monotonicity for nearly 100% of the households.
12checked a posteriori and is veri￿ed in all (S)-models, as well as in (U) and (G) once monotonicity is
imposed.
Considering the large list of coe¢ cients and the di¢ culty to interpret the results, regression tables are
omitted for (U) and (G) ￿they are available upon request. Nonetheless, to give a feel of the main aspects
captured in the unconstrained model, Table 4 provides the estimates of model (u), i.e., the basic version of
(U) where all heterogeneity is withdrawn. With these estimates, monotonicity in consumption is veri￿ed
up to a ￿ point of satiety￿of 7;012 EUR/month for choice H1 = 0 and up to 8;873 EUR/month for choice
H5 = 45 hours. Estimates show that the constant term is much larger for the institutional full-time work
duration (H4 = 39 hours). Clearly, model (U) picks other dimensions than pure preferences, including
availability of certain types of job, in the same way as (S3) does through variable costs.
Table 4: MNL estimation of the unconstrained model without heterogeneity
Variable Coef. Std. Err.
income²
x j=1 -142.4860 6.1620
x j=2 -125.7030 6.3610
x j=3 -142.3500 7.1610
x j=4 -113.3910 5.9560
x j=5 -102.4150 6.0470
income
x j=1 75.6200 17.4710
x j=2 72.4640 15.9410
x j=3 79.5140 18.4710
x j=4 67.1170 13.8650
x j=5 68.7850 12.9910
constant
x j=2 -1.5260 0.2200
x j=3 -2.6940 0.3470
x j=4 -0.6510 0.2340
x j=5 -3.1360 0.2720
Nb of observations
All parameters are significant at the 1% level. Income is divided by 40,000
model (u)
3397
4.2 Fit and Tests
We ￿rst compare the di⁄erent models according to their within-sample ￿t, as summarized in the left part
of Table 5. The McFadden pseudo-R2, written 1￿lnL=lnL0, gives the distance between the maximized
value of the log-likelihood (lnL) and the log-likelihood when all parameters are set to zero (lnL0). The
measure suggests a ranking of the di⁄erent models which is line with expectations. In particular, model
(S1) and (S2) are outperformed by ￿ exible models. The ￿t of model (S3) is almost as good as for (U).
Yet, a drawback of model (U) is the large number of parameters due mainly to the introduction of
household characteristics Zi in a ￿ exible way. We suggest a variant (U￿ ) which penalizes the model by
forcing the interaction terms ￿the double sum in (6) ￿not to vary with the labor supply alternatives.
This restriction can be justi￿ed by practical limitations due to curse of dimensionality problems. In this
case, the log-likelihood, and consequently the pseudo-R2, are very similar in both (S3) and (U). We also
13balance ￿t and parsimony by using the Akaike￿ s information criterion (AIC), written 2(￿lnL + 2K)=N
with K the number of model parameters and N the number of observations. In this case, structural
models (S1) and (S2) are still dominated by other speci￿cations. While the general model (G) beats all
the other models on the basis of its likelihood, it does not perform better than (S3) when penalizing for
the number of parameters in AIC values.
Table 5 also reports a series of likelihood ratio (LR) tests. The ￿rst set of results concerns the tests on
functional forms. The structural model most frequently used in the literature, (S1), is rejected at the 1%
level against the unconstrained speci￿cation (U). The extended version (S2), with ￿ exibility introduced
through the coe¢ cient related to the presence of young children, is also clearly rejected. As expected
from the previous measures of ￿t, the third version (S3) gains enough ￿ exibility and is not rejected
against (U). Conclusions are straightforward. First, discrete models of labor supply currently at use
impose unnecessary restrictions on the form of household preferences. Second, ￿ exibility can be attained
by introducing ￿ variable work costs￿(or any sort of choice-speci￿c dummies for all alternatives) or by
opting for the fully ￿ exible speci￿cation (U). These models are parametrically unidenti￿ed but ￿t the
data much better and maintain su¢ cient assumptions on agents￿rationality to be used for meaningful
tax reform analysis.
The second set of tests reports a clear rejection of the standard approach, i.e. a rejection at the 1% level
of (U) versus (G). Thus the ￿ true￿model underlying observed behaviors may be much more complex than
the unitary and static approach most often assumed for policy analysis. Several studies have previously
rejected some necessary conditions of the unitary model (income pooling and Slutsky conditions). For
instance, Fortin and Lacroix (1997) reject the pooling of non-labor income in the determination of labor
supply choices. The present test is di⁄erent for at least two reasons. This is a rejection of the standard
approach, not of the unitary model alone, since model (G) possibly captures intertemporal aspects.
Moreover, and most importantly, the test does not rely on a restrictive parameterization of preferences.
At this stage, the performance of each model has been assessed on the sample used to estimate the
models. Yet, richer speci￿cations bear the risk to capture idiosyncrasies of the data at use. To check for
over￿tting, we then use a standard validation method that consists in estimating each model on a random
60% of the sample (the ￿ training￿sample) and check model performance on the 40% holdout sample (the
￿ evaluation￿sample). For all models, pseudo-R2 computed on the evaluation sample are in the order of
those previous reported. Importantly, structural models (S1) and (S2) are still rejected against (S3) and
(U). We have repeated the exercise for smaller evaluation samples. In this case, sample size may be too
small to assume a chi-squared distribution of the the likelihood ratio statistic. Comparisons of pseudo-R2
nonetheless con￿rm that richer models outperform (S1) and (S2). Precisely, pseudo-R2 are around twice
as large in (U) and (S3), roughly the same order as in the within-sample validation. These results seem
to indicate that better performances are not driven by sampling-error over￿tting but, instead, that richer
speci￿cations (U) and (S3) better capture the complexity of labor supply behavior.16
16We detect however some over￿tting in model (U) compared to model (S3): pseudo-R2 evaluated on the holdout sample
are 15% and 19% respectively. While using the penalized version (U￿ ) suggested above, the two models become very similar
and have the same pseudo-R2, around 19%.
14In what follows, we illustrate the potential di⁄erences in model predictions when evaluating labor
supply elasticities and the e⁄ects of a tax-bene￿t reform. For this purpose, we focus on the structural
model (S2), which captures interesting features linked to variations in the cost of care for young children,
and on the ￿ exible models (U) and (G). Unsurprisingly, model (S3) yields very similar policy conclusions
to the penalized version of (U).
Table 5: Log-likelihoods and LR tests




S1 25 -4964 9% 2.94 U 1336 201
S2 28 -4876 11% 2.89 U 1160 197
S3 31 -4353 20% 2.58 U 114 193
U 181 -4296 21% 2.64 G 444 177
U' 100 -4345 20% 2.62 G 542 269
G 316 -4074 25% 2.58 - - -
Note: For U and G, the number of coefficient is reduced by 5 (i.e. the number of constraints imposed to guarantee C-monotonicity). Model U'
is a variant of U which is penalized on the way taste shifters enter the model. 'LR' is the likelihood ratio statistic and 'chi2(1%)' gives the chi-
squared value for the LR test at the 1% significance level.
Fit LR tests
5 Simulations
We ￿rst suggest a comparison of the average wage-elasticities obtained with the di⁄erent models. A
closed-form expression of elasticities is not available in our setting but wage-elasticities can be computed
numerically by evaluating the change in female labor supply subsequent to a uniform 1% increase in
the wage rate of all women in the sample. Because of the progressivity of the tax-bene￿t system, this
approach has the drawback that net wages will change di⁄erently for women facing di⁄erent e⁄ective
marginal tax rates (and by slightly less than 1%). However, this de￿nition is in line with the fact that
the actual tax-bene￿t system is the benchmark for policy analysis.
We use a calibration method to simulate transition matrices.17 An alternative way consists simply in
averaging predicted frequencies over all observations at each hour option. We ￿nd that the magnitudes
of labor supply responses are very similar with both methods. Con￿dence intervals for each transition
cell are simulated by drawing 500 times from the estimated asymptotic distribution of the parameter
estimates and by applying the calibration method for each of those parameter draws.
The left part of Table 6 reports elasticities of working hours (intensive margin) and participation
(extensive margin) respectively. Elasticities stand in a [:17;:45] range over the con￿dence intervals of the
17First, for the pre-reform situation (baseline) to display actual choices, we repetitively draw series of pseudo-residuals
b ￿ij (j = 1;:::J) from a EV-I distribution together with unobserved heterogeneity. For each household, we keep a series that
indeed leads to a perfect match between observed and predicted hours when using estimates of the deterministic model.
Post-reform optimal choices are then computed using the new disposable income values at each alternative and retaining
draws from the previous calibration step. The procedure is repeated 500 times to obtain transition frequencies for each
household. Transition tables result from averaging over the whole population. As usually done in simulation studies, we
assume that the policy change does not a⁄ect the random terms.
15di⁄erent models. These modest values are in line with recent ￿ndings for France (cf. ChonØ et al., 2003,
Donni and Moreau, 2007) and for several other countries (cf. Blundell and MaCurdy, 2000). Compared to
(S2), labor supply responsiveness is signi￿cantly larger with the ￿ exible form (U) and larger still with the
general model (G). In the latter, an increase in female wage could capture a higher bargaining position in
a collective model, while the intertemporal interpretation rather suggests the positive e⁄ect of a higher
wage pro￿le on labor supply.









Model (in %-points) (in %) (in %-points) (in %)
S2 0.14 0.20 -0.46 -0.62
[0.11; 0.17] [0.17; 0.25] [-0.54; -0.37] [-0.74; -0.50]
U 0.20 0.31 -0.79 -1.08
[0.17; 0.24] [0.27; 0.37] [-0.91; -0.65] [-1.24; -0.88]
G 0.30 0.37 -2.23 -3.08
[0.26; 0.34] [0.32; 0.45] [-2.79; -2.06] [-3.75; -2.69]
1% increase in own wage In-work benefit reform
Note: labor supply responses are computed using averaged simulated transitions; figures in brackets give bootstrapped
confidence intervals.
The reform we examine next is a scenario of in-work bene￿t that has been discussed lately in France,
namely the Earned Income Supplement (EIS) or Allocation Compensatrice de Revenue. It is similar to the
US earned income tax credit or the British working family tax credit (WFTC). It has been advocated in
France to o⁄set the disincentive e⁄ects of social assistance (SA) by complementing earnings of low-wage
households (see Godino et al., 1999). As a result, the EIS cumulated to SA corresponds to a transfer (350
euro/month for a single person plus increments to account for family size) reduced by 42% of household
income, instead of the current 100% taper rate in the SA scheme. There is no condition on minimum
work duration. Since this exercise merely aims to compare labor supply predictions across models, we do
not attempt to reach revenue neutrality when simulating the reform.
This type of policy measure strongly encourages single individuals and lone parent to take up a job.
However, it is conditional on household income and has therefore a well-known disincentive e⁄ect on
secondary earners in couples (cf. Blundell et al., 2000, in the case of the WFTC). In e⁄ect, means-testing
on joint incomes makes that the transfer is phased out as the second-earner increases her labor supply.
This is illustrated by the budget constraint of an hypothetical household in Figure 1. Using a structural
model similar to (S2), and assuming a 100% take-up, Blundell et al. (2000) ￿nd that around 28;000
women with an employed partner would stop working after the replacement of the old family tax credit
by the WFTC.
Responses to the introduction of the EIS in France are summarized in the right part of Table 6. Most
of the e⁄ects are negative ￿hardly any women are encouraged to take up a job or to increase their labor
supply. The proportions of women who would potentially leave the labor market are 0:46% using (S2)
and 0:79% with (U), which corresponds to 29;000 and 50;000 women respectively. While con￿dence
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Note: the budget curve is illustrated for a representative couple with two children.  The husband is assumed to work 39 hours/week
paid 1.33 times the minimum houly wage and the wife is paid at 1.2 times the minimum hourly wage.
Figure 1: E⁄ect of the Reform on a Hypothetical Budget Constraint
both results conclude that the disincentive e⁄ect of the reform is only moderately sized. Behavioral
e⁄ects are signi￿cantly larger with the general model (G) as 2:23% of the women in the sample would be
discouraged to work, i.e. around 142;000. Thus predictions turn out to be sensitive to the underlying
household representation. In particular, the fact that gross wages come into play directly in model (G)
￿and not only through disposable income as in standard models ￿a⁄ects the sensitivity of the model
to shocks upon the budget constraint, especially those due to policy reforms. Yet, the reform considered
here is obviously just one example and it a⁄ects primarily the budget constraint of low-wage households.
It would be interesting to con￿rm the present results for several reforms targeting di⁄erent income or
demographic groups in the population.
Conclusion
This paper ￿rst questions whether the possibility to use very general functional forms in discrete labor
supply models is exploited in practice. It seems that structural models currently used for policy evaluation
impose unnecessary constraints on leisure-consumption preferences. In these models, the identi￿cation of
preferences from costs of work rests on weak ground. Acknowledging these limitations, we suggest a model
where utility associated with the various hour choices depends on disposable income in a way that is totally
independent across alternatives. Coe¢ cients implicitly account for preferences together with costs of work
and other structural aspects which in￿ uence hour choices. A structural model with equal ￿ exibility would
require enough variability across alternatives, for instance through the introduction of variables costs of
work. In both cases, parametric identi￿cation is no longer possible but these models attain a signi￿cantly
17better ￿t to the data. At the same time, they maintain a strict utility-maximizing interpretation and
usual regularity conditions on consumption, which make them suitable for meaningful policy analysis.
Going one step further, we introduce a model with wage- and income- dependent preferences. This model
clearly departs from the usual standard representation used for policy analysis based on cross-sectional
data, that is, the unitary and static assumption. In e⁄ect, this model can well nest speci￿cations of
intertemporal or collective models. Nested standard models are strongly rejected against this general
setting.
Two paths could be followed in future research. First, it seems important to compare the predictions of
the di⁄erent models used for ex ante evaluation of reforms to actual changes following the reforms. Since
the magnitude of labor supply responses is sensitive to the structural model at use, ex post evaluations
of actual reforms may help to discriminate between the various models compared in this paper. Second,
additional restrictions could be put on the reduced-form utility of the general model in order to construct
and test alternative household representations, like the collective model of labor supply. In particular,
this could help to understand what information is carried by (non-pooled) income sources. Additional
variables may also be used for identi￿cation, as in Donni and Moreau (2007).
Two ￿nal aspects are worth mentioning. Attempts should be made to rule out demand-side aspects. A
straightforward solution consists in using data on desired rather than observed hours, as done for instance
in Ilmakunnas and Pudney (1990); it is nonetheless di¢ cult to make sure that individuals￿answers to
the preferred-hours question only re￿ ect preferences and are not themselves a⁄ected by labor market
constraints. Other ways to account for labor market in￿ exibilities with regard to the available options for
hours of work are suggested by Duncan and Harris (2002) and Aaberge et al. (1995, 1999, 2000). Also,
the questions asked in this paper concerning the ￿ exibility and identi￿cation of the deterministic part
of structural models may also apply to the stochastic components. Indeed, distributional assumptions
(e.g. extreme value) are potentially signi￿cant and random coe¢ cients, introduced to render unobserved
heterogeneity, may capture other dimensions (e.g. measurement errors due to the model discretization).
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